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Abstract 
Attempting to understand the fundamental mechanisms underlying spoken 
language processing, whether it is viewed as behaviour exhibited by human beings or 
as a faculty simulated by machines, is one of the greatest scientific challenges of our 
age.  Despite tremendous achievements over the past fifty or so years, there is still a 
long way to go before we reach a comprehensive explanation of human spoken 
language behaviour and can create a technology with performance approaching or 
exceeding that of a human being.  It is argued that progress is hampered by the 
fragmentation of the field across many different disciplines, coupled with a failure to 
create an integrated view of the fundamental mechanisms that underpin one 
organism’s ability to communicate with another.  This paper weaves together 
accounts from a wide variety of different disciplines concerned with the behaviour of 
living systems - many of them outside the normal realms of spoken language - and 
compiles them into a new model: PRESENCE (PREdictive SENsorimotor Control 
and Emulation).  It is hoped that the results of this research will provide a sufficient 
glimpse into the future to give breath to a new generation of research into spoken 
language processing by mind or machine. 
Keywords 
spoken language processing, speech technology, communicative behaviour, 
sensorimotor control 
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1. Introduction 
One of the greatest scientific challenges of our age is attempting to understand 
the fundamental mechanisms underlying spoken language processing, whether it is 
viewed as behaviour exhibited by human beings or as a faculty simulated by 
machines.  The past fifty or more years have seen tremendous progress in our 
appreciation of the reliability and robustness of the speech chain operating between 
speaker and listener, and a high degree of insight has been obtained into the principles 
underlying human speech perception, speech production and conversational discourse.  
More recently, great strides have also been made in our ability to implement an 
advanced spoken language technology that is capable of supporting a wide range of 
practical applications based on the automatic recognition and generation of speech as 
part of an interactive human-machine dialogue.  In fact given (i) the size of the 
combined speech research communities (estimated to be some 10 000 individuals 
worldwide), (ii) the high level of research effort that has been devoted to these areas 
over many years and (iii) the growing visibility of spoken language processing 
systems in everyday life, an outsider could be forgiven for assuming that the scientific 
questions are just about wrapped up - all that is left is to tidy up some minor academic 
details. 
However, as almost everyone working in these areas will readily 
acknowledge, the reality is that we still have a long way to go before our 
understanding of spoken language processing reaches a level that is capable of both 
providing a comprehensive explanation of human spoken language behaviour and of 
supporting a technology that can exhibit performance approaching or exceeding that 
of a human being.  Indeed, not only are these aspirations still far from our reach, but it 
is possible that simply extending our current theories and practical solutions may 
never lead to such a desirable state of affairs. 
1.1. Bridging scientific gaps 
Part of the reasoning behind this argument is that, not only are there major 
schisms between the different research communities addressing the issue of human 
versus machine spoken language processing, but knowledge is fragmented across an 
extremely wide range of disciplines that claim part-ownership of the area: acoustics, 
psycho-acoustics, phonetics, phonology, linguistics, psycho-linguistics, psychology, 
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auditory psychophysics, cognitive neuroscience, neural-imaging, human factors, 
signal processing, pattern recognition, computer science, machine learning, natural 
language processing, artificial intelligence, neuro-computing, engineering, graphics, 
virtual reality, interface agents, robotics etc. etc.  Integrating results from all of these 
different areas is itself a major challenge. 
Of course, this fragmentation is not unique to research in the field of spoken 
language processing.  Since Descartes, ‘scientific reductionism’ has dominated as the 
main paradigm for understanding natural phenomena (Burke, 1995).  For over 400 
years, scientists have made tremendous progress across the breadth of human 
knowledge by making assumptions and approximations in order to partition a problem 
into more easily addressable sub-parts.  However, the downside of the standard 
scientific method is that it leads inevitably to greater and greater knowledge about 
smaller and smaller aspects of a problem.  As a result, progress towards the 
unification of different theories can be slow and ponderous, and success on the 
scientific ‘grand challenges’ (Hoare and Milner, 2005) continues to elude the 
scientific community. 
1.2. The scale of the problem 
These are very important issues, not least in spoken language processing.  
Indeed, combining a statement by Dawkins (1991) about the complexity of human 
beings with an observation by Gopnik et al (2001) concerning the sophistication of 
speech, it can be argued that spoken language is the most sophisticated behaviour of 
the most complex organism in the known universe (Moore, 2005a).  It is therefore 
perhaps not surprising that, after only fifty or so years, we may still be just scratching 
the surface of a real and deep understanding of the fundamental mechanisms that 
underpin one organism’s ability to communicate with another, and the special role of 
spoken language as a key component of cooperative and competitive social 
interaction between human beings. 
Of course, the different scientific communities that study human spoken 
language and speech technology systems are not without their own ideas about where 
future progress might lie in their respective niche areas (Greenberg, 1996; Bourlard et 
al, 1996; Keller, 2001; Cooke, 2003; Hawkins, 2003; Lee, 2004; Morgan et al, 2005; 
Moore, 2005c).  However, what is missing is a truly integrated view that not only 
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draws the relevant pieces of knowledge together, but which also serves to provide a 
coherent explanation of what is, after all, a single behaviour. 
1.3. The puzzle of spoken language 
Clearly the issue being addressed in this paper is intentionally much more 
wide ranging than ‘bridging the gap between automatic and human speech 
processing’ (the main emphasis of this special issue).  In fact the paper leads to the 
conclusion that this innocent and enticing phrase may in itself be entirely misleading 
as to the nature of the challenge facing the different research communities.  However, 
rather than focus on the differences between the aims and achievements of the various 
spoken language research communities (Moore and Cutler, 2001), it may be more 
profitable to focus on an aspect of speech that is universally agreed to be the main 
scientific challenge: the immense variability of spoken language. 
Many authors have written extensively about the inherent variation, or lack of 
invariance, that is manifest in speech, both in terms of its cognitive basis and 
linguistic expression, as well as its audio-visual realisation.  For example, in her 
survey of fifty years of research in speech perception, Sarah Hawkins (2004) refers to 
the puzzle that “that we feel we hear stable, or invariant, percepts of words and 
phonemes despite their enormous articulatory-acoustic variability in different 
contexts”, and it is precisely an attempt to capture the immense 
variability/unpredictability in speech that drives the speech technology community to 
collect larger and larger corpora of speech data with which to train their statistical 
models for automatic speech recognition (Everman et al, 2005) or their inventories of 
concatenative segments for text-to-speech synthesis (Keller, 2001). 
1.4. Whither the source of variability in speech? 
It could be argued that the continued prevalence of unexplained variability in 
speech is an indication that its source may lie outside of the context in which it is 
being studied.  For example, one consequence of the fragmentation in spoken 
language processing research is that models of speech perception are treated 
somewhat independently from models of speech production1, and techniques for 
automatic speech recognition are developed quite independently from techniques for 
                                                 
1 In the sense that the one is not actively embedded within the other. 
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speech generation.  As a result, the majority of current explanations assume a basic 
stimulus-response relationship between distal cues and proximal percepts (and vice 
versa) based on the traditional view of the speech chain as a sequence of 
transformations linking a speaker’s production to a listener’s perception (Denes and 
Pinson, 1973).  The wider interactive and communicative function of speech tends to 
be sidelined, and thus any systematic behaviour (in production or perception) that 
results from speaker-listener interaction is inevitably observed (and hence modelled) 
as random variation. 
Indeed much of the recent progress in automatic speech recognition has 
derived from the introduction of stochastic modelling techniques specifically to 
handle unexplained variability within a sound mathematical (and computational) 
framework.  The use of conditional probabilities allows a modest degree of prior 
structure to be modelled (such as phonetic context-dependency), but any behaviour 
which is not static or which is uncorrelated with existing model parameters is obliged 
to be characterised as residual unexplained variation and thus accommodated within 
the variances of the probability density functions.  This approach is the basis of what 
Makhoul and Schwartz (1984) called ‘ignorance-based modelling’, and it has had 
considerable success.  However, a large part of the research community appears to 
have forgotten that, just because the use of statistics provides the best method of 
modelling variability (Jelinek, 1996), it does not follow that the underlying system is 
not highly deterministic.  This means that the search for structured models that 
explain systematic variation is still as important as the search for data to estimate the 
parameters of the models, and that the main challenge should be to reduce uncertainty 
in order to increase predictability. 
1.5. A way forward? 
This paper represents an attempt by the author to piece together the puzzle of 
spoken language processing.  Inspiration has been drawn from a wide variety of 
different disciplines - many of them outside the normal realms of spoken language - 
and some of the latest published ideas have been combined with some older proposals 
that seem to have been overlooked.  As one would expect, a complete solution has yet 
to emerge.  However, the author hopes that the broad framework of connections 
established in this paper will provide a sufficient glimpse into the future to give breath 
to a new generation of research into spoken language processing by mind or machine. 
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2. Collecting the Pieces 
Any attempt to weave together accounts from a wide range of different 
disciplines that are concerned with the behaviour of living organisms in general and 
human beings in particular, inevitably comes up against fundamental philosophical 
issues such as the nature of ‘intelligence’, ‘consciousness’, ‘thought’ and ‘emotion’, 
as well as questions about the structure and functioning of the brain.  Many of these 
areas are currently the subject of intense investigation, and inspiration for models of 
spoken language can be drawn from a number of key areas.  Five common threads 
that seem to emerge are (i) the illusion of invariance, (ii) the power of feedback 
control systems, (iii) the importance of memory and imitative behaviour in predicting 
future events, (iv) evidence for significant overlap between sensory and motor 
processes and (v) the fundamental role of emotion in driving behaviour. 
2.1. The illusion of invariance 
The immense variability in the behaviour of living organisms has been a 
subject of research for a very long time, and the behavioural sciences have developed 
a wide variety of tools and techniques in an attempt to understand the underlying 
variables that condition perceptual processing and motor behaviour in both humans 
and other living organisms. Brunswik (1952) was the first psychologist to 
acknowledge the role of uncertainty in the relationship between an organism and its 
environment, and he established an approach known as ‘probabilistic functionalism’ – 
or the ‘Brunswikian lens model’ - in which proximal percepts and their distal cues are 
distinguished from proximal responses and their distal effects - see Fig.1.  Brunswik’s 
model has had a significant impact on studies of human cognitive behaviour (e.g. 
Figueredo et al, 2006), as well as on spoken language (e.g. Scherer, 2003). 
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Fig.1.  The Brunswikian lens model of an organism’s relationship with its 
environment which emphasises the one-to-many mapping between a distal 
event and its proximal cues (stimulus) and the many-to-one mapping 
between proximal means and its distal achievement (response). 
 
In direct contrast to the stimulus-response models typified by Brunswik, 
Powers (1973) criticised the traditional behavioural science view that behaviour was 
unpredictable and random.  He observed that this perspective meant that scientists 
“spent a lot of time looking for generalisations that don’t depend on orderliness in 
behaviour (e.g. using stochastic approaches)”.  Powers argued that behaviour was 
indeed orderly, not in the sense of fixed (or stochastic) patterns of stimulus-response 
activity, but in that it is actively shaped by an organism into repeatable states and 
patterns.  In other words, organisms “act so as to get what they want, in the face of 
unpredictable events” (Taylor, 1999), and Powers saw this as evidence for the 
operation of feedback control processes.  Inspired by the power of control systems to 
explain complex dynamical behaviour, Powers introduced the general notion of 
‘Perceptual Control Theory’ (PCT) in which the behaviour of a living system is 
modelled using a hierarchy of such feedback control processes2.  In his view, the 
apparent lack of invariance in behaviour was an illusion that was created as a result of 
                                                 
2 Such an approach has subsequently been proposed quite independently by Grand (2003), and is 
posited in accounts of birdsong (Yu and Margoliash, 1996). 
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ignoring the influence of feedback and from not viewing behaviour as being a 
consequence of perceptual control. 
2.2. Perceptual control 
As an example of perceptual control in action, Powers (2005) cites the ease 
with which a human being is able to pilot a motor vehicle in a wide variety of driving 
conditions simply by occasionally checking the position of the vehicle on the road and 
making constant adjustments to maintain the desired trajectory.  A key property of 
such a feedback control process, based on a defined reference signal (i.e. “stay on the 
road”), is that such an architecture renders it unnecessary to make direct 
measurements of all the different conditions and variables that might disturb the 
intended direction of the vehicle (such as the speed of a side wind, the degree of 
camber, the angle of the bends, etc. etc.).  All that the driver needs to do is to pay 
sufficient attention to the perceptual consequences of their own behaviour and modify 
it accordingly. From such examples, Powers argues that behaviour is not simply a 
response to perceptual stimuli, but rather that behaviour is the control of perception 
(Powers, 1973). 
The basic architecture of a perceptual control system is illustrated in Fig.2.  
Behaviour of an organism is said to be driven by a reference signal that specifies its 
‘intention’ (or ‘needs’).  Behaviour is realised through motor action in the world 
which may or may not have the desired ‘consequences’ depending on the capabilities 
of the organism and any disturbances that may be present.  The result of the action is 
sensed by the organism and the perceptual ‘interpretation’ of the result is compared 
with the original intention.  Any difference – as manifest in an ‘error’ signal – gives 
rise to a behavioural adjustment that is designed to bring the interpretation closer to 
that which was desired.  The net outcome of such a negative feedback process is that 
behaviour is constantly modified to meet intentions in the face of varying levels and 
types of disturbance. 
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Fig.2.  Architecture of a perceptual control system. 
 
Of course the concept of a negative feedback control process is very familiar 
to most engineers, and the modern world could not exist without the field of Control 
Engineering3.  It is therefore astounding how little impact control theory has had on 
the behavioural sciences, or on models of spoken language (although see section 3.1), 
or indeed in speech technology systems (imagine arranging to heat a room to a 
particular temperature by applying the currently popular machine learning paradigm 
of stochastic modelling4). 
One cognitive area in which the power of closed-loop systems has been 
realised is in studies of the way in which human beings interact with real-time 
                                                 
3 Examples of everyday control systems include room thermostats, a cruise-control on a car, and many 
of the systems on board a modern aircraft. 
4 Heating an arbitrary room to a particular temperature requires the injection of just the right amount of 
heat based on the room’s size, the presence of other sources of heat and the means for heat loss.  All 
this can be calculated analytically, but if any of the variables change, e.g. a window is opened or more 
people come into the room, then these disturbances would have to be sensed, their implications 
measured and the overall calculations repeated.  Realising that such changes are unpredictable and 
happening all the time, and that the number of required sensors would get out of hand, the stochastic 
modeller decides instead to collect a database (in an attempt to capture the unexplained variability) 
with which to train a probabilistic system.  The resulting device gives the right temperature 95% of the 
time (as long as the test conditions match the training conditions) but, in order to reduce the error rate 
even further, the only approach that is found to work is to collect more and more data.  After many 
years of research, there is still a residual of variability that can’t be explained, and performance 
asymptotes.  Through all this, it has been failed to notice that a simple thermostat would have quite 
adequately handled the infinity of possible conditions to a defined level of accuracy. 
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interfaces.  Nicolelis (2001) observes that “by establishing a closed loop with an 
artificial device, the brain … can incorporate that device … into its somatic and 
motor representations, and operate on them as if they were simple extensions of our 
bodies”5.  This notion that closed-loop control allows an organism to view devices (or 
other organisms!) with which it is interacting as being components of itself may be 
key to understanding the mechanisms of communicative behaviour in general and 
spoken language in particular, as well as providing a possible source of hitherto 
unexplained variability. 
2.3. Emulation, imitation and perceptual prediction 
An interesting extension of the basic notions of PCT appears in the work by 
Grush (2004, forthcoming) on ‘emulators’.  Grush notes that neural feedback paths 
tend to be too slow to provide timely proprioceptive feedback for achieving fine 
motor control over fast, goal-directed movements.  However, he suggests that such a 
limitation can be overcome using an internal model - an emulator - that generates 
mock versions of proprioceptive and kineasthetic feedback in response to efferent 
copies of the relevant motor commands.  The controller gets feedback, not from the 
target system, but from the output of the emulator.  Grush calls this ‘pseudo-closed 
loop control’ – see Fig.3. 
 
CONTROLLER PLANT
EMULATOR
goal
goal behaviourcontrol signal
duplicate 
control 
signal
 
Fig.3.  Architecture of a pseudo-closed loop control system (after Grush, 
2004). 
 
                                                 
5 This hypothesis is related to J. Hawkins’ (2004) observation that, from the brain’s perspective, there 
is a lack of clarity as to where it ends and the external world begins, and to questions about how an 
organism distinguishes itself from others - some patients with parietal lesion cannot (Bechio, 2006). 
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Grush suggests that such an architecture not only solves the feedback timing 
issue but, by inhibiting the motor commands from going to the target system, it also 
provides a mechanism for motor imagery.  From this he concludes that motor centres 
would be active during motor imagery (a nod towards theories evolving from the 
discovery of ‘mirror neurons’ – see section 2.4), and that “imagined practice should 
also increase motor skills”.  Even more interesting, Grush goes on to hypothesise that 
sensory information can be processed by making a further extension to the model in 
which the emulator receives input from the sensory system as well as the efferent 
copies of the motor commands.  Grush calls this a ‘Kalman emulator’ (after earlier 
work by Gerdes and Happee (1994)) because it integrates sensor information and 
predicted state information - see Fig.4. 
 
TARGET 
SYSTEM
EMULATOR
motor 
commands
sensation
perception  
Fig.4.  Architecture of a ‘Kalman emulator’ (after Grush, forthcoming). 
 
The power of the Kalman emulator architecture is that it allows perceptual 
filling-in.  The central nervous system (controller) receives output from the emulator 
not from the sensory apparatus, and this means that the emulator’s output may be 
much richer than its sensory input (much like the behaviour of MINERVA2 (Hintzman, 
1986)).  In other words, imagination (in this case in the form of a forward model) is 
used to complete fragmented sensory inputs. 
Similar proposals have been made by Wilson and Knoblich (2005) in order to 
explain the observation that the perception of another organism’s behaviour activates 
imitative motor plans in the perceiver.  For example, they refer to research by Fadiga 
et al (2002) and others that the potentiation of muscles in a subject’s own mouth 
increases when they listen to or watch speech.  Also evidence for emulation is 
provided by the well-known ‘Chameleon effect’ (Chartrand and Bargh, 1999) in 
which people unconsciously mimic the behaviour of others (such as crossing their 
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arms, or adopt similar facial expressions)6.  Wilson and Knoblich, like Grush, suggest 
that covert imitation functions as a mental simulation running in parallel to external 
events in order to generate top-down expectations and predictions for perception.  
Indeed they note that perceptual prediction is extremely common, and cite the familiar 
experience whereby anticipation of the next song on a favourite CD as the current one 
comes to an end can be so strong that you almost hear it. 
It is therefore possible to hypothesise that the emulation of one’s own abilities 
(to overcome neural transmission delays) could subsequently have been recruited in 
order to emulate the behaviour of others for the purposes of perceptual prediction.  
Indeed Wilson and Knoblich cite evidence that people have more knowledge of 
themselves than of others, and conclude that “perceptual prediction of others is 
dependent on the specific qualities of one’s motor programming”.  This result is 
supported by the neuro-imaging studies of Sokhi et al (2005) in which male subjects 
appeared to compare heard male voices with the internal representation of their own. 
The notion of perceptual prediction is the core idea in an influential popular 
book by Jeff Hawkins entitled ‘On Intelligence’ (2004).  Based on Mountcastle’s 
(1978) observation that the neocortex is remarkably uniform and hence that all areas 
could be performing the same basic operation, Hawkins’ hypothesis is that 
‘intelligent’ behaviour is based on what he calls a ‘memory-prediction framework’7.  
Hawkins proposes that a key ingredient of intelligence is the storage of sequences in 
memory which are subsequently used (through a hierarchy of abstraction 
mechanisms) to predict what is going to happen in the external world.  The purpose of 
the hierarchy - which is based on the six-layer columnar organisation of the cortex - is 
to manage the predictive framework at different levels of abstraction, starting at the 
lowest level of patterning and only rising to higher levels if the low level patterns are 
not as expected.  From this Hawkins suggests that attention mechanisms would be 
directed by the novelty of the input, and that as unpredicted events rise in the 
                                                 
6 Interestingly, the ability to overtly imitate vocally is not universal.  According to Fitch (2000), it 
seems that vocal mimicry is limited to human beings, birds and aquatic mammals (i.e. not apes or other 
primates).  Jarvis (2004) hypothesises a common basis for the evolution of brain pathways for vocal 
learning and human language. 
7 The memory-prediction framework is being realised (and commercialised) through a technology 
called ‘hierarchical temporal memory’ (Hawkins, 2005). 
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hierarchy, so they eventually enter ‘consciousness’.  Hawkins places the hippocampus 
at the top of the neocortical pyramid. 
What is interesting about Hawkins’ memory-prediction framework is that it 
not only focuses on perceptual prediction, but also on the information that is used for 
prediction - in this case, episodic events stored in memory combined with derived 
abstractions that permit prediction by analogy.  This is a crucial step in generalising 
from past to future experience.  What is missing in the memory-prediction framework 
is the realisation of the intimate connection between perceptual and motor processes 
implied by PCT and emulation mechanisms, although Hawkins does describe a 
balanced system of afferent and efferent neural pathways.  Clearly there is interesting 
potential in bringing together these different mechanisms for explaining and 
predicting variability, and an attempt to do so is presented in section 5. 
2.4. Mirror neurons, sensorimotor overlap and ‘theory of mind’ 
Thus far the discussion has alluded to, but not directly addressed, the obvious 
conceptual links between PCT and emulation, and the relatively recent discovery of 
‘mirror neurons’ (Rizzolatti et al, 1996; Rizzolatti and Craighero, 2004).  Mirror 
neurons were first identified in the F5 area of premotor cortex in monkeys, where 
neural discharge was found to occur not only when a monkey performed an action, 
but also when that monkey observed a similar action being performed by another 
monkey.  Subsequent research has confirmed the existence of such neural structures 
in humans, as well as other animals, and they have been implicated in the process of 
action understanding, intention recognition (Bechio et al, 2006) and learning by 
imitation (Rizzolatti and Craighero, 2004) in conspecifics. 
The notion of action understanding through access to motor planning is a 
direct analogue of the predictor-emulator processes discussed in the previous section.  
What is interesting is that there is again a strong suggestion of very close coupling 
between sensorimotor processes (Frith, 2002), and this is backed up by recent 
evidence from work on neuro-imaging (Wilson et al, 2004; Walter, 2004; Aboitiz et 
al, 2005; Warren et al, 2005).  It seems that perceptual processes and motor processes 
in living organisms cross-refer to each other in order to support each other’s prime 
function; motor behaviour accesses perceptual information for checking the success or 
otherwise of its actions, and perceptual processes access motor areas to impute 
underlying meaning to the actions of others. 
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Indeed, interpreting the behaviour of other organisms based on extrapolations 
from one’s own behaviour appears to have close links with the general principles of 
‘theory of mind’ (Baron-Cohen et al, 1985; Baron-Cohen, 1997), and these ideas 
coupled with mirror neurons have been implicated in the evolution of language 
(Rizzolatti and Arbib, 1998; Studdert-Kennedy, 2002).  Explanations of behaviour 
that exclude the possibility of such sensorimotor overlap would inevitably suffer from 
an inability to account for key hidden dependencies, leading to an increase in the 
apparent level of unpredictable variation. 
2.5. Emotion, affect, individuality and consciousness 
The formal study of emotion in human (and animal) behaviour has a long 
history, from the early observational work of Charles Darwin (1872) up to the recent 
emergence of ‘Affective Science’ (Davidson et al, 2003).  Over that period, three 
main categories of psychological model of human emotion have emerged.  The 
earliest ‘discrete’ theories of emotion (stemming from Darwin’s work) hypothesised 
the existence of a small number of basic emotions, such as happiness, sadness, fear, 
anger, surprise and disgust (Ekman, 1999).  In such theories, it is supposed that these 
emotions are based on specific physiological response patterns to external stimuli.  
Another early model of emotion is the ‘dimensional’ approach (Wundt, 1874) in 
which a wide variety of emotions are mapped into a low-dimensional space that 
reflects subjective aspects of behaviour (such as positive vs. negative and active vs. 
passive).  Cowie et al (2001) use such a scheme as the basis for FEELTRACE, a 
computer-based tool for annotating emotional data.  The third, and most recent, 
theoretical view of emotion is the ‘componential’ model which emphasises the 
variability of different affective states, and links the production of an emotion to the 
appraisal of a situation with respect to an organism’s needs and goals (Scherer et al 
2001). 
The appraisal mechanisms hypothesised in the componential model of 
emotion is clearly reminiscent of the comparison between intention and realisation 
within a control feedback process outlined in section 2.2.  It is possible to hypothesise 
that the error signal resulting from a deviation between a desired state and a perceived 
level of achievement represents a level of tension within a system, and thus could be 
viewed as a direct correlate of emotion.  In a complex organism (or system) with a 
multiplicity of control loops, there would be a corresponding population of error 
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signals and hence emotional states.  Emotion could thus be seen as a multi-
dimensional force that actually drives behaviour rather than simply as a response to 
external events (Taylor and Fragopanagos, 2005). 
Emotions could not only drive behaviour, but they could also guide attention.  
Any sensory input that is perceived to be a deviation from expectations (predictions) 
could be treated as salient - i.e. potentially information bearing - and thus could lead 
to a range of behavioural adjustments such as the recruitment of additional resources, 
an increased weighting on appropriate sensory channels, or an increased weighting on 
an error signal.  In a control feedback system, the latter is equivalent to an increase in 
the ‘loop gain’, and would result in increased sensitivity (and hence, emotion). 
Clearly an organism can make such adjustments ‘on-the-fly’ as a function of 
the situation it finds itself in.  However, it is also possible to hypothesise that the set 
of default settings would, in some sense, characterise an organism’s general approach 
to the world.  Such settings could be said to constitute the ‘individuality’ of the 
organism and, depending on their values, some members of a population might be 
particularly sensitive, other rather slow to respond, others highly un-predictable, etc.  
This ties in very well with the observation by Scherer (2003) that emotion is actually 
a special group of behaviours within a wider set of affective states that also include 
mood, interpersonal stances, attitudes and personality traits8.  Also, it is possible to 
hypothesise that the parameters associated with such settings could themselves be 
controlled by a PCT-style loop.  This implies an architecture in which control systems 
are parasitic on others, i.e. it is not only possible to envisage a hierarchy of controls 
operating on various levels of intention (Powers, 1973; Grand, 2003), but also 
controlling the parameters of the systems carrying out the intentions. 
This notion can be further extended to link up with the proposals made by 
Alexandrov and Sams (2005) in which they attempt to unify emotion and 
consciousness.  Their argument, based on the fact that the mechanisms of evolution 
involve morphological differentiation and refinement rather than replacement, is that 
emotion and consciousness are essentially emergent properties of the same process, 
where there is a continuum of fine-grained emotional states between low-
                                                 
8 It is interesting to note that excessive gain in a control feedback loop can lead to hard-limiting 
(extreme) behaviour, excessive delays can lead to oscillatory behaviour, and excessive damping slows 
response times making it difficult to react quickly enough in time-critical situations. 
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differentiated ‘old’ systems (based on behaviours such as approach and withdrawal) 
and highly-differentiated ‘new’ systems.  They specifically state that a “comparison 
of the predicted and achieved results is the essence of consciousness”, and this ties in 
closely with Jeff Hawkins’ (2004) proposal within his memory-prediction framework 
that prediction failures at low levels rise up the hierarchy until they enter into 
consciousness.  In support of their theory, Alexander and Sams (2005) observe that 
individual development goes from global ‘preferenda’ to detailed ‘discriminanda’, 
and that early stages of behaviour are characterised by greater emotionality. 
Affective behaviour can thus be viewed, not as unpredictable variation 
overlaid on emotionally neutral forms, but rather as the main driving force behind all 
behaviour.  Models that do not take this into account will be unable to access a 
significant conditioning variable on which much subtle behaviour might depend. 
3. Parallels with Some Existing Models of Spoken Language Processing 
The areas discussed above have been highlighted because they offer insights 
into the wider behaviour of living organisms of which spoken language can be seen to 
be an interesting and important special case.  Whilst none of the areas have had an 
impact on mainstream models of human or machine spoken language processing, two 
- feedback control and sensorimotor overlap - have interesting parallels with some 
existing models, thereby lending support to the relevance of such behaviour. 
3.1. Feedback control processes in spoken language 
The notion that spoken language behaviour might involve feedback control 
processes was established by Levelt (1983, 1989) in his ‘perceptual loop theory’ of 
monitoring in speech production.  Based on evidence from speech errors and repairs, 
but apparently unaware of Perceptual Control Theory, Levelt argued that the 
surprising accuracy of speech production could be explained by a process of ‘self-
monitoring’ “based on parsing one’s own inner or overt speech”.  His model - known 
as ‘WEAVER++’ - includes two feedback loops: one based on auditory feedback, and 
another based on the assessment of an internal pre-articulatory representation (see 
Fig.5), and it has been very successful in accounting for empirical data (e.g. 
Hartsuiker and Kolk, 2001; Slevc and Ferreira, 2006) – thus lending support to the 
importance of feedback in spoken language processing. 
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Fig.5.  Perceptual loop theory of self-monitoring in speech production 
(Levelt, 1983, 1989). 
 
The main emphasis of Levelt’s model is on the selection of lexical items 
during speech production (i.e. the inner loop) rather than on the overt auditory 
feedback path.  Of course it is well known that being able to hear your own voice has 
an effect on speaking (Bailly, 1997; Perkell, 1997).  For example, profoundly deaf 
speakers can have great difficulty maintaining level control or accurate pronunciation 
(Geers and Moog, 1992), and delayed auditory feedback can give rise to stuttering-
like behaviour (Fairbanks, 1955). 
Also, it is well established that speakers alter their behaviour dynamically as a 
function of the communicative context.  Almost one-hundred years ago, Lombard 
(1911) described how speakers in a noisy environment not only raise their level to 
compensate for the competing noise, but also make fine adjustments to their 
articulations in order to avoid any localised spectral prominences that might be 
present in the sound field.  More recently, Lindblom (1990) introduced his ‘H&H’ 
(hyper-hypo) theory as a compelling explanation of the observation that “speakers 
can, and typically do, tune their performance according to communicative and 
situational demands”.  Lindblom’s main argument was that the lack of invariance in 
speech arises because speakers constantly adjust their level of ‘clarity’ in order to 
maintain sufficient phonetic contrast.  His key point was that the need to maximise 
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discriminability is balanced by the need to minimise the energetic cost of the 
movements involved.  As a result, he hypothesised that speakers dynamically tune 
their articulation between hyper- and hypo-articulation as a function of the 
information required for successful lexical access by the listeners.  Lindblom also 
noted that clear speech is not simply normal speech produced louder, but that it also 
involves the reorganisation of articulatory gestures and acoustic patterns. 
The apparent lack of invariance in speech that inspired the H&H theory is 
clearly highly reminiscent of the general arguments supporting PCT presented earlier.  
Indeed, Lindblom drew inspiration from the effectiveness of feedback control loops as 
the underlying mechanism for compensatory motor behaviour in general (i.e. not just 
in speech) as well as in the behaviour of other living organisms.  He also pointed out 
that H&H contrasted directly with the mainstream stimulus-response theories of 
speech perception, such as the Motor Theory (Liberman and Mattingly, 1985), 
Quantal Theory (Stevens, 1989) and Direct Realism (Fowler, 1986). 
Another area where there is dramatic evidence of PCT-style feedback-induced 
compensatory behaviour in spoken language is infant-directed speech or ‘parentese’.  
Parentese is typically slower, more clearly articulated, contains exaggerated pitch 
contours and has a higher average pitch than adult-directed speech (Kuhl, 2004).  Not 
only is this behaviour adopted by carers in order to be better understood, but it is also 
thought to play a role in encouraging imitative behaviour and thence learning by the 
child. 
3.2. Links between speech perception and speech production 
A very influential paper by Rizzolatti and Arbib (1998) describes how the 
human mirror neuron system includes Broca’s area; hence they have proposed that 
mirror neurons provide a bridge between motor activity, gestural communication and 
the evolution of language.  Studdert-Kennedy (2002) developed this line of argument 
in the direction of speech, proposing that speech perception and speech production 
must be linked if communication is to take place between speaker and listener.  He 
observes that the Motor Theory of speech perception (Liberman and Mattingly, 1985) 
can be viewed as a special case of the general principle of imitative behaviour, and 
also proposes that Meltzof and Moore’s (1997) ‘active intermodal matching’ (AIM) 
model for facial imitation could be extended to vocal mimicry. 
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Further neurobiological support for tight links between speech perception, 
speech production and speech understanding is provided by the discovery that hearing 
a word activates its articulatory motor programme, and understanding an action word 
leads to the thought of the corresponding action (Pulvermüller, 2005).  Pulvermüller 
hypothesises that these results support existing psycholinguistic models such as the 
Motor Theory, but he also links the cortical basis of short-term memory with what he 
calls ‘articulatory perception-action loops’. 
4. Piecing it all Together 
The foregoing provides a strong but diverse base on which to build a coherent 
picture of intelligent behaviour in general and spoken language processing in 
particular.  A common thread running throughout is that not only are perceptual and 
motor processes intimately connected through control loops that use both overt and 
covert sensory feedback for motor planning, but they are also linked by emulators that 
provide the basis for memory-based predictive behaviour that is synchronised with 
sensory input.  Evidence for all these mechanisms operating in human spoken 
language processing is quite strong, and yet only a few are invoked in contemporary 
models or systems. 
However, not all of the pieces are in place – underpinning all of the foregoing 
mechanisms are the fundamental factors that ultimately determine an organism’s 
fitness to survive in an evolutionary framework: energy, time and entropy.  The 
management of energy facilitates efficient behaviour in the context of scarce 
resources, the management of time facilitates efficient planning in the context of 
potentially harmful situations and the management of entropy facilitates efficient 
communications in the context of information sparsity. 
4.1. Communication: entropy management 
In spoken language, behaviour involves much more than executing or 
understanding motor activity; its primary function is active9 communication between 
speaker and listener (Fry, 1977; Cherry, 1978).  Humans, as well as many other living 
                                                 
9 Active communication involves the voluntary or intended transfer of information from one organism 
to another; passive communication is involuntary or unintended, and refers to one organism’s 
awareness of the existence of another.  Both types of communication could use the same channels. 
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organisms (Brainard and Doupe, 2002; Fitch and Hauser, 2004; Meguerditchiana and 
Vauclair, 2006)10, have discovered that it is possible to exploit the ability to 
understand the actions of others by influencing those behaviours in desirable 
directions (for example, to woo a mate or to warn group members of a predator).  In 
voluntary communication, the intention is to achieve a desired effect on another 
organism, rather than one’s own desired behaviour, and this means that the 
sensorimotor loop must include all parties. 
From an evolutionary perspective, it can thus be speculated that sensory 
behaviour, initially established to detect the presence of food or danger was 
subsequently recruited to determine if one’s own behaviour was achieving the desired 
goals.  This, in turn, provided the basis of a mechanism for understanding the 
intentions and motivations of other organisms – especially those of conspecifics 
(since they are most similar to oneself, and hence most easily predicted on the basis of 
information drawn from one’s own motivations and abilities11). 
Language has thus evolved to exploit this ability, first by manual and vocal 
gesture (as evidenced by the fact that sign language and spoken language share the 
same neural substrate (Emmorey, 2002), and the latest results on baboon 
communication (Meguerditchiana and Vauclair, 2006)) then, driven by growing 
tension between the physical signs and the objects and events to which they refer 
(caused by a release from the need to ground the signals explicitly), by increasing 
abstraction towards semiotic behaviour.  Once on this path - a path shared by a 
number of different species (Arnold and Zuberbühler, 2006) - human beings evolved 
an ability to handle recursive behaviour (Hauser et al, 2002; Fitch and Hauser, 2004) 
thereby creating a particulate structure (Abler, 1989; Studdart-Kennedy, 2002) with 
combinatorial properties that exploded to provide the capacity for full linguistic 
expression that we possess today. 
It can be therefore be hypothesised that the process of evolutionary 
development has given rise to an increase in the entropy of the information transferred 
                                                 
10 Interestingly, the communication systems evolved by several other species appear to exhibit the same 
compensatory mechanisms that are present in human speech (Doyle, 2006; Lengagne et al, 1999). 
11 From this it can be predicted that one would have increasing difficulty understanding the behaviour 
of organisms that are most unlike oneself, and there would be a natural tendency to anthropomorphise 
(even for physical objects – such as a wayward car!). 
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between one organism and another: from fractions of a bit per second (bps) using 
manual gestures to about 100 bps for human spoken language.  100 bps may appear to 
be a very low figure in comparison to a modern digital telecommunication system 
(which typically transmits speech at ~13K bps), but in reality it is extraordinarily high 
for a communication channel between living organisms. 
4.2. Behaviour: energy management 
Another missing piece of the puzzle is the ubiquitous requirement for effective 
energy management in living organisms.  With infinite energy resources it is very 
easy to plan motor behaviour – all obstacles can be overcome through sheer strength 
of force.  For example, the quickest route between two points would always be a 
straight line if an organism could simply punch through anything in its path.  
Similarly, communication can be guaranteed if an organism is prepared to articulate at 
maximum clarity and maximum volume all the time.  However, the reality of living 
systems is that energy is an extremely precious commodity, and economy of effort 
pervades all behaviour (and has done so from the dawn of evolution). 
The consequence has been that energy conservation has had a strong influence 
on the strategies that have developed for controlling behaviour.    Even the constraints 
that operate on the main power source for speech - the breathing mechanism and the 
lungs - may have a fundamental (but much overlooked) impact on the organisation 
and structure of spoken language (Messum, 2005).  Also, Lindblom’s H&H theory 
(see section 3.1) explains how a pressure to minimise articulatory effort has shaped 
the very nature of spoken language behaviour towards a system based on relative 
phonetic contrast rather than absolute phonetic targets.  Not only that, but an 
important property of the predictive nature of energy efficient perceptual processes is 
that resource can be allocated on the basis of the salience of incoming information.  
Communicative signals would naturally evolve to exploit the properties of such an 
attention mechanism, and would thus exploit un-predictability subject to information 
theoretic constraints.  Speaker behaviour then becomes one of actively managing the 
attentional resources of the listener for teleological goals, with both speaker and 
listener applying the principle of least effort to achieve their respective goals (Zipf, 
1949). 
In addition, selective evolutionary pressure would have favoured organisms 
that invoked global rather than local strategies for optimising energy usage.  
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Successful organisms would thus inherit very effective search mechanisms that could 
be recruited for global optimisation against other kinds of criteria, and from this it is 
possible to see the emergence of a powerful mechanism for the selection of behaviour, 
i.e. planning. 
4.3. Planning: time management 
Living organisms are obliged to operate in real-time; all behaviour must be 
organised in concert with the ongoing time course of relevant events in the real world.  
An organism with slow reactions, or an inability to construct an appropriate solution 
to a problem in time, is likely to come under severe evolutionary pressure.  Likewise, 
an organism that is obliged to find a solution by overt behaviour will not only incur a 
time penalty if it needs to back up, but it will also expend extra energy resources as it 
does so. 
Simulating events using a form of internal ‘virtual reality’ thus not only 
provides an ability to discover solutions faster than real-time, but also offers the 
possibility of exploiting global rather than local search behaviours with considerably 
reduced overhead in terms of energy expenditure.  Of course, if a search within such 
an emulation mechanism takes too long, then there would be knock-on problems for 
driving the real-time system.  Indeed there is evidence for just such a process 
operating in speech production based on analysis of the behaviour of various types of 
stuttering (Howell, 2001, 2002).  In general, such catastrophic planning failures can 
be avoided by increasing the processing resource available to the emulation process, 
or by increasing the constraint on the search that it has to perform (for example by 
reducing the amount of available memory or by not considering all of the possibilities, 
i.e. reducing attention)12. 
                                                 
12 Although the causes and explanations of stuttering are perhaps the single most contentious issue in 
the field of speech pathology, it is nevertheless interesting to speculate tentatively (based on the 
arguments in this paper) that it could arise from a lack of sufficient processing resource, from the 
allocation of too much memory or attention, or that the emulation and the real-time system are not 
sufficiently de-coupled such that covert planning behaviour leaks into the overt performance.  This 
would suggest that the dramatic success of frequency-shifting devices in reducing stuttering (Howell, 
2001) could arise from the conversion of the auditory feedback into someone else’s voice thereby 
disengaging the low-level planning process and reducing the level of attentional resource allocated to 
speaking. 
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Interestingly, the dual hypotheses that emulation involves a global search 
process and that emulators are invoked in understanding the behaviour of others, have 
direct analogues in the graph search mechanisms employed by both computational 
models of human word recognition (Norris, 1994; Scharenborg et al, 2003a, 2003b, 
2005) and contemporary algorithms for automatic speech recognition (Rabiner and 
Juang, 1993; Huang et al, 2001; Holmes and Holmes, 2002).  The key difference 
between such graph search techniques and the emulators being proposed here is in the 
source of the information that is used to derive the underlying data structures.  In the 
emulation approach such data structures are derived initially from simulations of an 
organism’s own motor abilities, whereas the contemporary models of human and 
automatic word recognition employ models of the surface behaviour of other 
organisms. 
Of course the key to planning is the ability to predict the future based on a 
record of the past (stored in memory).  In the stochastic modelling paradigm, this is 
achieved through the natural abilities of probability theory to generalise through 
extrapolation and interpolation.  However, although such an approach is attractive 
(especially to achieve a level of abstraction from base-level data, or to store 
information efficiently with the minimum of memory), it does carry the overhead of 
requiring substantial observational experience in order to estimate the parameters 
and/or structure of the models, as well as blurring the fine detail of the information 
that is being stored.  A complimentary approach is to formulate predictive behaviour 
based on the ordered compilation of fragmentary traces of episodic memory 
(Hintzman, 1986; Goldinger, 1996; Goldinger, 1998; Tulving, 2002). 
5. The PRESENCE Model 
It is now possible to begin to construct a model of behaviour in general and 
spoken language processing in particular in which speech is characterised, not in 
terms of individual independent static components, but as an interactive joint 
behaviour between participants that is conditioned on communicative context – a 
whole-system view in which a speaker has in mind the communicative needs of a 
listener, and a listener has in mind the communicative intentions of a speaker 
(Fujisaki, 2005) – replacing the ‘speech chain’ (Denes and Pinson, 1973) with the 
‘speech loop’ (Moore, 2005b).  This new model is called the PRESENCE - 
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‘PREdictive SENsorimotor Control and Emulation’ - theory of spoken language 
processing. 
5.1. Core behaviours 
The basic principle underlying PRESENCE is that it should be a sufficiently 
general model of behaviour that it can be applied to all but the simplest of living 
organisms, and thence to any artificial device that attempts to enact a behaviour 
normally associated with living organisms or to interact with them.  In this context, 
and assuming that an organism is sufficiently motivated that it has a need to continue 
to exist, then the core behaviours are: 
• to need: an internal setting that defines a level of attainment necessary 
for an organism to maintain its health (e.g. Maslow’s (1943) hierarchy 
of biological, physiological, safety, belongingness, esteem and self-
actualisation needs); 
• to sense: the ability of an organism to experience external events; 
• to know: a memory store containing information derived from genetic 
inheritance or acquired through sensory experience; 
• to imagine: a predicted set of events that could happen in the future 
(including their projected consequences) based on interpolation and 
extrapolation of existing knowledge using mechanisms for emulation; 
• to intend: a desire for a particular event to occur, for example meeting 
a need; 
• to plan: a search over all the things that could happen in order to find a 
sequence of events that achieve the organism’s intention; 
• to act: selecting a behaviour in order to change the natural course of 
events and cause a particular event to take place; 
• to anticipate: a particular prediction of what might happen in the 
future; 
• to perceive: a check that anticipated events are consistent with sensory 
information; 
• to attend: the process of giving weight to sensory information which is 
not consistent with anticipated events, and for allocating resource in 
order to maximise the accuracy of prediction mechanisms; 
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• to interpret: a search over all the things that could have happened in 
order to find which one fits the observed realisation and hence to 
decide what has happened; 
• to feel: a judgement of the closeness between the intention of an act 
and its perceived realisation; 
• to remember: to add experiences, interpretations and associated 
contextual variables to memory; 
• to learn: the accumulation in memory of sensorimotor experience 
together with the derivation of sophisticated prediction mechanisms 
based on similarity/analogy; 
• to imitate: an attempt to act out an organism’s interpretation of what 
has happened in order to learn more about its hidden structure (for 
better prediction) as well as to learn how to perform it itself; 
• to communicate: an action that is intended to influence another 
organism. 
These core behaviours more or less follow a logical sequence of dependencies 
with ‘needs’ as the most basic and ‘communication’ as the most sophisticated.  
However, each serves the others, and it can easily be seen how spoken language - the 
ultimate in communicative interaction - still plays just as much a role in everyday 
survival as it did in the distant evolutionary past. 
5.2. Architecture 
The general architecture of the PRESENCE model is illustrated in Fig.6. 
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Fig.6.  Architecture of the PRESENCE model (where S represents ‘self’, O 
represents ‘other’, N: needs, I: intentions, M: motor activity, E(): 
emulation). 
 
This much simplified version of PRESENCE illustrates some of the key 
functionality within an organism.  The architecture is roughly organised into four 
layers.  The top layer is the primary route for motor behaviour.  An organism’s need 
(need of ‘self’ - Ns), modulated by motivation, conditions an intention (intention of 
‘self’ - Is) that would satisfy that need (determined by a process of search - as 
indicated by the diagonal arrow running through the module), which then drives both 
a motor action (Ms) and an emulation of possible motor actions (Es(Ms)) on the second 
layer.  Sensory input feeds back into this second layer, and thence determines if the 
desired intention has been met.  The large block arrows indicate that the one process 
is derived from the other, and the small block arrows indicate a flow of information in 
the opposite direction.  Both are intended to represent a process of parameter sharing 
or ‘learning’. 
The third layer of the model represents a feedback path on the behaviour of 
‘self’ based on emulating the effect of its behaviour on ‘other’.  In other words, Eo(Is) 
represents the emulation by ‘other’ of the intentions of ‘self’, and Es(Eo(Is)) 
represents the emulation of that function by ‘self’.  A similar arrangement applies to 
Es(Eo(Ms)).  The fourth layer in the model represents the organism’s means for 
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interpreting the needs, intentions and behaviour of others though a process of 
emulating their needs, intentions and behaviour based on their emulation of one’s own 
needs, intentions and behaviour. 
Overall, what the model attempts to capture is the general principles of the 
process whereby the perceived needs of others can change the needs of self, and 
hence give rise to totally different strategies for behaviour.  The architecture 
illustrated is purposefully neutral with respect to the modality of an organism’s 
interaction with the environment, or indeed the complexity of the organism involved.  
A specific instantiation would require a considerably more complex arrangement, 
with hierarchical structures and multiple parallel synchronous streams.  However, a 
key feature is that the PRESENCE model effectively sidesteps the long-running 
bottom-up vs. top-down debate, and instead substitutes a more integrated view of 
sensorimotor processes. 
Also, a core aspect of PRESENCE not illustrated in Fig.6 is the related 
memory structures, and the processes for learning, acquisition and plasticity.  
Interestingly the latter has some parallels with ‘adaptive critic architectures’ (Barto, 
1995). 
6. Implications for Models of Spoken Language Processing 
PRESENCE models speech as an emergent behaviour from the interaction of 
two (or more, depending on the number of interlocutors) parallel and integrated 
hierarchical perceptual control processes supporting the efficient exchange of 
communicative intent based on predictive emulation.  It is assumed that the prime 
function of speaking - the communicative intent - is not to control the speaker’s 
perception of their own voice, but to control listener behaviour.  Therefore, all other 
forms of feedback are subservient to this role - even the control of a listener’s 
perception of the linguistic message13.  As a result, depending on the perceived 
success of communication, the speaker controls the level of intelligibility and 
comprehensibility, not simply by using more or less speaking effort, but by actively 
                                                 
13 In other words, the prime goal of communication is to get a listener to do something or to tell them 
something for some purpose.  The linguistic message may be clear, but the listener may still not act on 
or integrate the information until its salience (to them) is made clear. 
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not saying what the listener might hear by mistake in the perceived communicative 
context. 
Similarly, a speaker controls the listener’s perception of the speaker’s 
affective state (emotion, mood, interpersonal stances, attitudes, personality traits) and 
individuality.  However, as with the other behaviours, this may or may not be 
successful – a speaker may attempt to portray themselves in a certain way, but any 
mismatch between actual and transmitted internal states may be detected by the 
listener and interpreted accordingly.  This kind of adaptive behaviour can be readily 
seen in social situations where certain accents might have implied stereotypical 
associations which a speaker wishes to avoid. 
What is common to all these behaviours is that they can only be controlled 
under arbitrary conditions if there is a feedback loop.  So PRESENCE not only 
incorporates mechanisms for real-time appraisal, but also the emulation of such 
behaviours for assessing their putative impact prior to articulation.  In this case, the 
speaker’s emulations are based on models of the listener that the speaker has derived 
from the speaker’s model of themselves. 
From the listener’s perspective, as well as inversions of the above processes 
for interpreting the speaker, PRESENCE also incorporates mechanisms for 
controlling the allocation of attentional resources such as listening effort and the 
weighting of sensory data.  As in speaking, emulation plays a major role in 
interpretation; not only can information about the current state of the external world 
be derived before actual sensory input arrives, it can also continue quite adequately 
even if it doesn’t arrive or without using additional attentional resources. 
Interpretation of a speaker’s behaviour within a general acoustic environment 
is thus seen in the PRESENCE model as a ‘phase-locking’ between the listener’s 
expectations and sensory input such that attention need only be applied where 
expectations deviate from reality (i.e. to minimise ‘listening effort’).  This means that 
PRESENCE models perception as an active process of selective confirmation that the 
world is as expected14.  This is closer to the schema-driven view of perceptual 
                                                 
14 This is in accordance with theories of saccadic eye movements in visual perception (Yarbus, 1967; 
Slaney, 1997), ‘missing data’ theory (Cooke et al, 2001), Cooke’s (2003) glimpsing model of speech 
perception, and the sampling of language that a child performs in acquiring speech (Gopnik et al, 
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processes (Varga and Moore, 1990, 1991; Moore, 1996) than to the traditional 
‘bottom-up’ view of a comprehensive passive analysis continuously attempting to 
figure out what is going on (Marr, 1982; Bregman, 1990)). 
6.1. Implications for human spoken language processing 
Clearly it is quite straightforward to map the general attributes of the 
PRESENCE model to the special communicative functions of spoken language.  As 
presented, the model does not distinguish between different representational levels as 
would be usual in a classic acoustic-phonetic-syntactic-semantic structure for speech.  
Such structures may be invoked, for example by de-composing Ms, but it may be 
interesting to consider the implications of viewing them as ‘emergent’ properties of an 
integrated system, rather than as explicit partitioning of the internal processes. 
The key difference between PRESENCE and the standard models of human 
speech generation and recognition discussed earlier is the inclusion of mechanisms for 
perceptual prediction that facilitate the emulation of self and of others (as well as 
self’s emulation of other’s emulation of self etc!).  These referential structures are 
intended to capture the hidden dependencies that pervade natural speech 
communication, and provide an explicit source of variation in speech production as 
well as a means to interpret such speech in the face of any communicative context. 
Therefore, the new challenges that PRESENCE brings to research into human 
spoken language processing are mainly in the area of memory and sensorimotor 
overlap.  What data structures are accessed during spoken word recognition, and how 
are those structures related to the motor abilities of the listener?  If it is acknowledged 
that a speaker’s production is conditioned their model of a listener, what implications 
does that have for models of word recognition that do not invoke such assumptions?  
What are the consequences for mismatch between the internal models of speaker and 
listener, e.g. during conversation between people with different first languages? 
PRESENCE would also appear to offer the possibility of unifying different 
levels of linguistic representation within a single explanatory framework.  Can 
hitherto disparate areas such as prosody be similarly integrated?  Is it now possible to 
view intonational structure within the context of a communicative loop as part of the 
                                                                                                                                            
2001).  As observed by Powers (1973), a control feedback process can function quite adequately by 
only occasionally sampling its sensors – a process he called ‘synchronous detection’. 
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control mechanism for directing attention at the linguistic level?  Should 
conversational turn-taking be modelled as an emergent consequence of the interaction 
of two organisms with different wants and needs?  
PRESENCE also offers a model on which to base explorations of language 
evolution and the acquisition of spoken language by children as well as second-
language learners.  PRESENCE points to the existence of particular configurations of 
data and control structures; how might these arise in evolutionary framework, is it 
possible to hypothesise a staged developmental process linked to anatomical 
structure?  Is imitative behaviour an essential step towards the efficient pooling of key 
information resources, and how did the recursive particulate structure that appears to 
be unique to language first arise? 
These, and many other questions, are stimulated by the PRESENCE model.  
What thus becomes clear is that, as intended, PRESENCE has the potential to draw 
together a wide variety of disparate areas - all within one unifying theoretical (and 
computational) framework - towards a comprehensive and coherent explanation of 
spoken language behaviour. 
6.2. Implications for speech technology 
The implications of PRESENCE for speech technology are potentially rather 
direct.  For example, the PRESENCE architecture suggests a new type of speech 
synthesiser that would (i) listen to its own output, (ii) perceive the effect that it is 
having on its listeners, and (iii) modify its behaviour accordingly in order to maximise 
its communicative intentions in the face of situational noise and disturbance.  Such a 
‘reactive speech synthesiser’ would alter its output characteristics on-the-fly as a 
function of the perceived effectiveness of its intended communication, and this would 
be judged by the provision of a suitable (auditory and/or visual) feedback path. 
Fig.7 illustrates the architecture of an advanced text-to-speech (TTS) system 
in which the effectiveness of the output speech is controlled according to the 
perceived effect on the listener.  In order to do this, it is necessary to include a model 
of the listener within the feedback loop – in this case an automatic speech recogniser.  
This means that the overall system can effectively be described as ‘synthesis-by-
recognition’ (SbR).  No contemporary text-to-speech synthesiser has this capability, 
although something along these lines was suggested by Fallside in 1990, and Howard 
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and Huckvale (2005) are conducting some very interesting research into training a 
speech synthesiser as a vocal mimic. 
 
TTS HSRs ww
d n+d
ASR
+
-
 
 
Fig.7.  PRESENCE-inspired architecture for a novel form of text (w) to 
speech (s) synthesiser which alters its output in order to maximise 
recognition accuracy in the listener in response to arbitrary noise (n) and 
disturbance (d). 
 
Of course, the architecture depicted in Fig.7 is intended to be illustrative of the 
general concept.  In practice, it would be necessary to invoke a rich network of 
control systems operating at different levels of linguistic abstraction.  Such a new type 
of spoken language generator/synthesizer would thus be able to control and monitor 
its behaviour at many different layers including output volume, phonetic fidelity, 
choice of words and linguistic phrasing. 
For perceptual interpretation, PRESENCE effectively employs a ‘recognition-
by-synthesis’ (RbS) approach in which the emulators are generative models.  Of 
course existing automatic speech recognition (ASR) systems already use generative 
models, usually in the form of hidden Markov models (Rabiner and Juang, 1993; 
Holmes and Holmes, 2002).  However, an HMM is a very poor model of a speaker; it 
is static and lacks fine phonetic detail.  PRESENCE therefore predicts a new type of 
speech recogniser/interpreter that, instead of HMMs, would utilize the richer structure 
of an actual speech generator/synthesiser based on episodic traces of actual 
performance.  No contemporary ASR does this, although recognition-by-synthesis 
was first proposed by Bridle and Ralls in 1985 and some early results were published 
by Blomberg et al in 1987.  Fig.8 illustrates the architecture of a system in which 
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speech is interpreted with respect to the output of a putative natural language and text-
to-speech generator. 
 
NLG
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w
-
+
s
w
 
Fig.8.  PRESENCE-inspired architecture for a novel form of automatic 
speech recogniser that incorporates natural language and text-to-speech 
generators. 
 
In practice, the architecture depicted in Fig.8 would be expanded to include a 
rich network of control systems in order to reflect the complexity of structure in the 
putative generator.  However, a particularly interesting outcome is that PRESENCE 
also suggests that the synthesis structures should be derived from the speech of the 
listener rather than the speaker.  This rather counter-intuitive result highlights the 
potential benefits of establishing relationships between different sets of speaker-
dependent models, rather than the usual approach of using speaker-independent 
models followed by speaker adaptation (Leggetter and Woodland, 1994). 
Another compelling aspect of PRESENCE is the fact that the memory-
prediction component suggests a role for episodic traces of behaviour (in both 
perception and production).  This not only lends support to contemporary ASR 
research that is investigating exemplar-based representations in order to retain fine 
phonetic detail (De Wachter et al, 2003; Axelrod and Maison, 2004; Maier and 
Moore, 2005), but also has a direct analogue in contemporary unit-selection based 
TTS (Dutoit, 1997; Keller et al, 2001).  As yet, these two areas of speech technology 
have not been unified into the single computational framework suggested by 
PRESENCE. 
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The simple architectures illustrated in Figs. 7 and 8 represent the first step on 
the road to more advanced forms of integrated automatic speech recognition and 
synthesis.  For example, the recognition component in Fig.7 could be substituted by 
the architecture in Fig.8 (and vice versa for the synthesis components) leading to 
SbRbS and RbSbR.  Such recursive structures are inherent in PRESENCE, and they 
represent a huge potential for pooling information and for parameter sharing in a 
practical system.  The consequence is that such advanced systems would have 
embedded within them the means to explain the variability arising from the 
communicative context without having to be trained on ever larger quantities of 
speech data – truly a major step forward in the speech technology field. 
Finally, although ASR and TTS are important areas of stand-alone technology, 
the core function of PRESENCE is to encompass the interaction between speaker and 
listener, in this case between a human user and a machine-based service.  It will thus 
be necessary to incorporate research on dialogue into the PRESENCE framework, and 
indeed recent work in adaptive dialogue systems shows the value of employing user 
preference feedback and reinforcement learning to influence system behaviour 
(Walker et al, 2004), and this is being extended to personality (Mairesse and Walker, 
2005).  A more comprehensive approach would invoke a multiple interacting 
hierarchy of PRESENCE-based processes, each balancing individual needs and 
desires with an understanding of the needs and desires of a user through grounded 
communicative interaction in a situated and embedded environment. 
7. Conclusion 
The author is well aware of the dangers facing a scientist attempting to step 
outside the confines of their main discipline.  It is very easy to appear naïve or foolish 
by failing to deal with the conventions and subtleties well understood by the local 
practitioners.  Nevertheless, despite the high risks involved, this paper has attempted 
to draw together theoretical ideas from a wide range of different disciplines and to 
place them side by side in the hope that it would be possible to catch a glimpse into 
the wider workings of spoken language processing.  It is hoped that, like a half-
completed jigsaw, it will be possible to interpolate what we might expect to find 
where pieces are missing.  In the view of the author, a coherent picture appears to 
beginning to emerge in the form of the PRESENCE model.  However, whether the 
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attempt has been successful is ultimately a matter for the reader to decide and for the 
future to determine.  Nevertheless, if these arguments hold water, then it is possible to 
conclude that it will never be possible to collect enough data to fully characterise the 
relationship between the linguistic message and the acoustic realisation, and that 
bridging the gap between human and automatic speech processing is only going to be 
possible if both communities step outside their usual comfort zones to consider the 
wider issues of human behaviour. 
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